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Abstract. The doctrine of the Intelligent Design offers an intuitive explanation of why 
the ordering in the Universe is authored by an intentional agency. Due to its appeal 
to common-sense perception, this doctrine is endorsed even by scientifically literate 
circles despite of its obvious contradiction with the discoveries of science. In this article, 
an attempt to apply the tools of the cognitive science of religion to the appraisal of the 
methodological and epistemic status of the ID doctrine is presented. It is concluded 
that the ID doctrine may serve as means of the real-time metaphorical reassurance of 
the creative power of God while it cannot give grounds to any literal inferences on the 
nature of the Divine action.
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Introduction
The belief in the ordered character of the Universe has been present in the 
human thought since the times of antiquity. The contemporary doctrine of 
the Intelligent Design (further denoted as ID) grew in the 1980’s out of the 
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creation science which aimed at providing scientific support for the literal 
account of creation as portrayed in the Book of Genesis (e.g. Keane 1999). In 
most general terms, the ID stipulates that the high level complexity and the 
ordering of the living organisms in the Universe as well as their adaptation 
to the demands of the environment imply that they were purposefully 
brought forth by an intelligent designer and not by the workings of the laws 
of nature. Although the inconclusiveness of these arguments is nowadays 
commonly accepted (e.g. Ayala 2009, 128–149), the efforts to justify the 
scientific character of the ID still receive considerable interests as they 
appeal to simple intuitions rather than sophisticated scientific arguments 
(e.g. Chaberek 2004; Giertych 2016; Jodkowski 2007). 
The goal of the presented article is to subject the doctrine of the Intel-
ligent Design (further denoted as ID) to the scrutiny of the tools of a novel 
division of cognitive science named the cognitive science of religion from both 
methodological and epistemic point of view. In particular, this scrutiny will 
allow for the assessment of the influence of the development of science on the 
validity ID’s inferential power. So far it has been established with the methods 
of the cognitive science of religion that the argumentation in favor of the ID 
follows upon the content specific human cognition acquired in the course of 
specific evolutionary scenarios that have programmed the human mind to 
interpret the patterns of ordering in the Universe as resulting from the action 
of intentional agents (Barrett 2011). To put things bluntly, we are in-born 
“intelligent designers” whether we like it or not. It is not surprising that the 
belief in the ID turns out to be the most natural and immediate response to 
the experience of the ordering of the Universe. Moreover, it explains why the 
belief is so widespread in the common sense perception and why it takes time 
as well as scientific maturity to leave the pre-scientific intuitions behind.
The pursuit of the article’s goal will proceed in the following steps. 
Firstly, the conceptual content of the ID doctrine will be surveyed to establish 
its fundamental claims. This step will hinge upon the precise distinction 
between ordering and design and the mechanisms of the spontaneous 
emergence of ordered structures in the Universe. Secondly, the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for the preference of the human mind in placing 
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the intentional agency as responsible for the effects of ordering will be 
presented. Thirdly, based on some preliminary considerations by Grygiel 
(2017), the impact of the development of science on the activation of these 
mechanisms will be assessed. And fourthly, it will be claimed that although 
the ID doctrine cannot serve as means to draw any specific conclusions on 
how ordering emerges in the Universe, it constitutes a suitable metaphor 
to support of the belief in God as the Creator of the Universe. 
1. The Intelligent Design and Its Conceptual Content
Before the unpacking of the conceptual content of the ID doctrine is ac-
complished, it is worthwhile to carry out a simple semantic analysis of the 
concepts of order and design. In regards to order, its basic meaning derives 
from logic of relations to articulate the idea of precedence. No mention of 
the authorship of this order is ever made. The etymology of the term design, 
however, clearly refers to the activity of specifying or to singling out from 
among the many. Moreover, design is often used alternately with project. This 
yields meaning complementary to design, namely, that of throwing forward 
whereby a certain idea is metaphorically visualized as being thrown upon 
a chaotic substratum. Consequently, two semantic components of design 
must be taken into account: purpose and perfection. In regards to purpose, 
design implies the activity of a designer, namely, a conscious agent who, 
driven by a specific goal, makes a deliberate choice from a large number of 
options available. By acting with purpose the designer does not arbitrarily 
select any option available like in a lottery but elicits a considerable effort 
to arrive at a unique arrangement that fits his/her rational plan. Once this 
plan is placed in the framework of participation in the world of the Platonic 
eternal forms, it acquires the attribute of perfection. 
This simple semantic analysis can be given a more precise meaning with 
the use of the mathematical concept of probability. The standard definition 
of probability understood as the ratio of the number of willed choices to 
the entire number of options from among which these choices can be 
made indicates that there might be an connection between events of low 
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probability and the activity of an intentional agency. It seems intuitively 
fitting that the more unique the character of the choice, that is the lower its 
probability due to the precision of its selection, the need to postulate the 
designer’s intervention appears to be more obvious. According to Aristotle, 
events of low probability qualify as accidental: “The accidental, then, is 
what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part. Now we 
have said what the accidental is, and it is obvious why there is no science 
of such a thing; for all science is of that which is always or for the most 
part, but the accidental is in neither of these classes” (Aristotle 1941, 862). 
This assertion brings in a new element into play, namely, that of qualifying 
chance events as intractable by the scientific method. Consequently, there 
arises a clear-cut intuitive dichotomy in the explanation of the occurrence 
of events in nature: high-probability predictable events occur as workings 
of the regularities built into nature while the low-probability chance events 
call for an intervention of an intentional agency. 
With the conceptual tools thus specified it is now possible to tackle the 
conceptual content of the ID doctrine. It gained its greatest momentum in the 
90’s as efforts were undertaken to fight off theory of the Darwinian evolution 
(Davis and Kenyon 1993, 99–100). The main objection advanced by the ID 
relies precisely upon the dichotomy explained above: if the natural selection 
responsible for the increase of complexity in the Universe rests on chance, 
it is unable to bring forth entities as complex as the living organisms. An 
American theologian, John. F. Haught, who testified as an expert in theology 
at the famous trial held in the USA in 2005 against the introduction of the 
ID doctrine into the high school biology curriculum, defines this doctrine as 
“a set of ideas, as well as a vocal cultural movement, that seeks to curb the 
influence of Darwinism by insisting that science must invoke a non-natural 
‘intelligent cause’ for such seemingly improbable phenomena as speciation 
and cellular complexity” (Haught 2008, 193). 
The precise arguments in favor of the ID were proposed by two of its most 
vocal advocates: a biochemist Michael Behe (1996) and a mathematician 
William Dembski (1995). Behe has coined out the concept of the irreducible 
complexity as he has argued that the functions of certain complex biological 
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structures could not have been developed trough the gradual increase of 
complexity. In regards to the origin of systems such as the biochemical 
machinery of vision he asserts the following: “They were designed not by 
the laws of nature, not by chance and necessity; rather they were planned. 
The designer knew what the systems would look like when they were com-
pleted then took steps to bring the systems about” (Behe 1996, 193). In the 
effort to explain how one might know that a given system has originated 
through design, Behe continues: “design is evident when a number of sep-
arate, interacting components are ordered in such a way as to accomplish 
a function beyond the individual components. The greater the specificity of 
the interacting components required to produce the function, the greater 
is our confidence in the conclusion of design” (Behe 1996, 193). 
The intriguing link between specificity and design comes more visibly 
to the fore in the ID conceptualized by Dembski as the specified complexity. 
This is a convoluted formal argument carried out within the theory of 
information. In a nutshell, Dembski maintains that specified complexity 
appears in a given system when the system contains a great amount of 
independently specified information and is complex, that is, it exhibits a low 
probability of being formed. He illustrates these ideas with the following 
example: “A single letter of the alphabet is specified without being complex. 
A long sentence of random letters is complex without being specified. 
A Shakespearean sonnet is both complex and specified” (Dembski 1999, 
47). Since Dembski expressly associates the process of specification with 
the activity of the designer, the process may be considered as reflecting the 
intuitive meaning of the intentional setting aside or singling out contained 
in the term de-sign discussed above. Yet such singling out by itself is not 
of any significance unless it operates on a large population of individuals 
thereby making the selection truly unique and original. Regardless of how 
persuasively Behe’s and Dembski’s arguments may sound, they do not 
provide any explanation on how to make a transition from the objective 
features of the design such as specificity and complexity to the subjective 
mental states of an intelligent designer. This is exactly where the tools of 
the cognitive science of religion enter in. 
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2. Intentionality and design
The main premise for the application of the tools of the cognitive science 
of religion to the analysis of the ID doctrine is to establish why the human 
mind intuitively posits a conscious intentional agency as the the cause 
of the ordering of the Universe. The particular suitability of the tools of 
the cognitive science of religion to assess the ID doctrine consists in two 
factors. Firstly, these tools rely on a extremely general conception on who 
a god might be with no reference to any religious traditions. Barrett states 
that “gods, here, will refer to: (1) counterintuitive intentional agents, (2) 
that a group of people reflectively believe exists, (3) that have a type of 
existence or action (past, present, or future) that can, in principle, be detected 
by people, (4) and whose existence motivates some difference in human 
behavior as a consequence” (Barrett 2011, 97). The counterintuitivity which 
takes up the role of supernaturality in this case implies that the tools of the 
cognitive science of religion easily apply in situations where the causes of 
ordering do not have to be of divine nature at all. Secondly, the cognitive 
science of religion rests on the assumption that religiosity thus conceived 
is an evolutionary byproduct (Boyer 2003). Accordingly, religiosity did not 
emerge as a result of a specific evolutionary adaptation but arose due to 
the operation of the ordinary natural cognitive powers of the human mind. 
The first important point in the cognitive explanation of the origin of 
design is that the human mind exhibits a strong conceptual bias, namely, 
content – specific cognition, that manifests itself through an array of intu-
itive expectations on what the world is like and what course of the natural 
phenomena is to be foreseen. These expectations sum up to what is termed 
as the folk ontology. Pascal Boyer has pointed out that the religious beliefs 
where gods are conceptualized as intentional agents arise largely based on 
intuitive (non-reflective) concepts to facilitate the efficacy of these beliefs 
in the real-time operation (e.g. Boyer 2001). Barret has put forward the 
thesis that the quickly spreading religious concepts need to be minimally 
counterintuitive, that is, to violate the folk ontology only to a certain small 
degree (Barett and Nyhoff 2001). Additionally, these concepts must exhibit 
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substantial inferential potential to form reflective beliefs so that sense can be 
made out of what is being observed and experienced in reality. It turns out 
that these are the minimally counterintuitive intentional agents equipped 
with mental states which qualify as the chief meaning making tools. 
What are the reasons for this particular applicability of the concept of 
an intentional agent to make sense out of reality? The evolutionary expla-
nations of this state of affairs rely on the two basic cognitive mechanisms 
called the hyperactive agency detection device (HADD) and the theory of mind 
(ToM) otherwise called the folk psychology. The HADD was first suggested 
by Stephen Guthrie and its primary function is to purposely over-interpret 
the perception of a self-perpelled motion as resulting from the action of 
an intentional agent equipped with mental states (Guthrie 1993; Barrett 
2000, 31). Since such a motion has no visible mechanical cause, it violates 
the expectation of physicality whereby it triggers the HADD so that the 
attack of a predator can be avoided and the reproductive success secured. 
The theory of mind supplements the workings of the HADD by supplying 
the array of possible mental processes and motivations that might have led 
to the behavior perceived (Barrett 2011, 74–77). 
What truly counts as fundamental from the point of view of this study, 
however, is the HADD reveals sensitivity not only to the actual motions of 
a supposedly minded agent but to the traces of its activity as well (Barrett 
2004, 36–39). The traces may include easily recognizable objects such as 
deer trails and bird nests as well as any other manifestations of ordering. 
If the encountered pattern does not correspond to any familiar mechanical 
or biological cause, the human mind will likely place an intentional agency 
as its cause because it has a natural bias towards explaining the perception 
of ordering in the teleological terms rather than to stipulate the activity 
of natural causes. This phenomenon has been extensively studied by an 
American psychologist, Deborah Kelemen (1999). The studies performed 
on young children demonstrated a marked preference in explaining a given 
natural regularity by answering the question “what for?”. Consequently, 
a design or a regularity encountered in nature can be easily clarified as the 
activity of an intelligent designer and – ultimately – of a creator (2004). 
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Further justification of why the human mind intuitively associates 
orderings observed in nature with a purposeful action of an intentional 
agent comes from an argument based on probabilities. Some indications 
in this regard have been made by De Cruz and De Smedt but they call for 
further substantiation (De Cruz and De Smedt 2015, 72–76). What follows 
is a proposal of such as substantiation conjectured by the author of this 
study. The conditions under which local ordering in the Universe may take 
place, are given by the laws of thermodynamics which involve entropy as the 
formal measure of disorder (Penrose 1991, 309–317). These laws stipulate 
that the local ordering reflected in the local decrease of entropy must be 
accompanied by the local decrease of the internal energy. The energy of 
a system can be lowered through work that is performed on it (e.g., Atkins 
and de Paula 2014, 134–146). This fact agrees with the intuitive experience 
of having to invest a considerable and purposeful effort into achieving 
results that require organization of things into coherent unities (e.g., 
building a house). Similarly, the disintegration into chaos and formlessness 
occurs spontaneously in nature and its prevention always demands external 
intervention. This observation suggests that there may exist a link between 
the process of ordering and the activity of a personal intentional agency, 
that is a designer. 
This link becomes evident as one considers Boltzmann’s definition of 
entropy given by the famous formula S = k lnΩ, where k is the thermodynamic 
constant and Ω is the number of equivalent microstates available to a system 
in a certain macrostate. The complexity of the system in Dembski’s terms 
indicates that there is a large number of possible configurations – micro-
states available to this system whereby the probability of picking out a single 
one is low. Such a process of selection will result in a significant decrease 
of entropy as compared to the situation in which the complexity was small 
meaning that much greater force will need to be exerted in the same time 
period to achieve selection in a complex system. And now comes the key 
cognitive argument. According to Leslie, the subjective mental representation 
contains three distinct levels with the representation of a mechanical force 
being the most basic one that supplies information to the two higher ones 
8(1)/2020 173
T H E D O CT R I N E O F T H E I N T E L L I G E N T D E S I G N. . .
(Leslie 1999, 137). Consequently, as Sørensen states, “representation of force 
is an implicit part in both understanding entities in the world as agents with 
intentions and in being an agent oneself when acting with specific goals in 
mind based on beliefs” (Sørensen 2005, 173). In conjunction with the laws 
of thermodynamics, this statement yields a possible explanation of why 
the perception of order may intuitively invoke an intentional agency as its 
primary cause and why such an agency produces events of low probability. 
Despite of its conjectural character calling for a more in-depth empirical 
study, it seems rational to expect that the capacity of producing design 
qualifies as another constituent of the folk ontology, that is, the content 
specific expectation of what it means to be human. 
3. Conquering counterintuitivity
There is no doubt that the new scientific discoveries slowly but constantly 
shift the threshold of what qualifies as counter-intuitive. The possibility 
of overcoming the cognitive biases through the growth of the scientific 
knowledge and its subsequent cultural dissemination has been convincingly 
argued by De Cruz and De Smedt (2012). For instance, the introduction 
of one of the most fruitful conceptual tools of the contemporary physics, 
namely, that of a field, clearly does away with the intuitive belief that motion 
occurs through contact with a visible cause. Since fields are invisible carriers 
of forces spreading over the entire space, their effects occur as having no 
visible mover. More importantly, as revealed by the theory of the dissipative 
systems, ordering into very complex low-probability structures such as living 
organisms does not have to mean design because it can be brought forth by 
the workings of the natural laws. To put things in short, life is a dissipative 
structure (Heller and Życiński 1990, 104–110). According to this theory order 
can naturally emerge out of chaos so that no intervention of an intelligent 
designer is necessary in this process (Prigogine and Stengers 1990). The 
emergence of ordering in the Universe involves two strategies: (1) the 
necessity of the laws of nature combined with (2) chance as the random 
character of fluctuations of the environment. Since these fluctuations fall 
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under rigorous mathematical treatment within the probability theory, the 
evolutionary origin of live in the Universe can be easily subsumed within 
the scientific rationality of a mathematical character (e.g. Heller 2012, 
273–316). Consequently, chance no longer contradicts order but becomes its 
seminal constituent. This suggests that what for the scientifically illiterate 
generations immediately led to the acknowledgement of the workings of 
an intelligent designer no longer has to have this effect for those that are 
scientifically informed. 
Moreover, the studies of the evolutionary processes of bringing forth this 
growth reveal that the characteristics of these processes does not coincide 
with the idea of a design resulting from the purposeful activity of a designer. 
This is particularly evident in the specificity of the natural selection that 
brings forth novelty not by means of the optimization of a new project but by 
means of slow modifications of the existing structures. In short, the novelty 
resulting from the workings of the natural selection is imperfect and flawed 
(Ayala 2007). For instance, this imperfection appears in the structure of the 
human brain that could have been designed as a much more efficient and 
structurally organized device (Korzeniewski 2005, 34–36). Interestingly 
enough, it turns out that yet in the 19th century the famous advocate of the 
ID, William Payley, was quite aware of the imperfections of nature but in 
light of his overwhelming conviction on the purposeful authorship of the 
Universe he disregarded them on the premise that their impact was minimal 
(Payley [no date], 46). 
In order to gain more focus in addressing this problem, Grygiel has 
suggested the concepts of the vincible and invincible counterintuitivity to 
reflect the dynamic nature of the scientific knowledge in its impact on 
the formation of a religious belief (Grygiel 2017). In particular, these 
concepts allow for the articulation a purely hypothetical situation in which 
counterintuitivity would eventually become entirely vincible upon the 
formulation of a scientific theory of everything capable of grasping the 
ultimate meaning of reality (e.g. Hawking and Mlodinov 2010). There is 
a common agreement, however, that such expectations amount to no more 
than sheer illusion (Heller 2006). This agreement builds on a practical and 
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a theoretical premise. The practical premise was clearly stated by Albert 
Einstein who was deeply convinced that science unveils only a very small 
part of the vastness and complexity of the physical reality while most of 
it will always remain a profound mystery (Einstein 1931). To put things 
in short, nature has sufficient amount of novelties in stock to generate 
counterintuitivity for many generations of researchers to come. It is not 
surprising that Richard Swinburne has revamped the argument from design 
by claiming that the abstract laws of physics call for an intentional agency 
to explain their origin (Swinburne 1992).
The theoretical premise was clarified by Michael Heller who pointed 
to three irremovable gaps in knowledge that cannot be patched up with the 
scientific inquiry: the ontological, the epistemological and the axiological 
(Heller 2003). In case of the ontological gap one asks the Leibnizian question 
of why there exists something rather than nothing while following Einstein 
the epistemological gap prompts the question of why the Universe is ratio-
nal, namely, why its laws assume their particular form. Since the pertinent 
answers fall outside the competence of science, the problem of the ultimate 
origin of the structuring of the Universe will never be scientifically resolved 
although it may shift to a very abstract level as evidenced by the highly 
advanced formalisms of the contemporary physical theories. 
Inasmuch as the development of science is an objective process of 
departing from intuitions proper to the folk ontology, what truly counts 
for the formation of beliefs in the causal activity of intentional agencies is 
how the human mind responds to this development. It turns out that this 
response reveals two constituents. They were pointed out to by Barrett as 
he commented on the very process of the human mind being confronted 
with the outcomes of the theory of evolution: “we do not simply outgrow 
the tendency to see the purpose in the world but have to learn to override it” 
(Barrett 2011, 71). He rests this statement on extensive empirical research 
revealing that the folk ontology intuitions remain operative even in the 
conditions of the high level of scientific literacy. Consequently, these 
intuitions remain permanently invincible whereby the efficacy of beliefs 
useful in making sense out of routine events in the real time thinking is 
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assured. What strikes as remarkable at this point is how well human mind is 
actually sealed off from the possibility of conquering all counterintuitivity: 
should the intuitive conceptual biases be ever overcome and should the 
folk ontology ever catch up with the actual state of the art in science, it 
is unlikely that nature itself will ever run out of surprises. And even if it 
finally did, the irremovable gaps will ultimately enter in and terminate all 
scientific inquiry. 
The specificity of the mechanism of the natural selection that has been 
addressed at the beginning of this article points to another aspect of the 
invincibility of the inference of the intelligent designer’s authorship of the 
ordering in the Universe. As it has been already explained, this mechanism 
executes a short sighted ad hoc strategy of imperfect adjustments to the 
existing structures to secure their proper adaptation to the environment’s 
fluctuations. Since ordering does not seem to be manifest to perception in 
such an instance, the HADD should not fire and the activity of an intentional 
agent should not be detected. On the other hand, however, the detection 
of imperfections of the evolutionary outcomes does rely on the knowledge 
of rather advanced biology unavailable at the times when William Payley 
formulated his famous claims. Therefore, it seems justified to expect that 
these imperfections will not significantly obstruct the activity of the sci-
entifically uninformed intuitions especially that the theory of dissipative 
systems based on the deterministic chaos yields rational explanation of 
their origin. 
4. In connection with religion
Although the contemporary ID doctrine does not reveal an explicitly 
religious agenda, it is hard to disentangle this doctrine from its theological 
significance. After all, the representation of God the Creator as an intelligent 
designer entered the theological thought yet in the Middle Ages through the 
formulation of the teleological argument for the existence of God. Later on, 
for instance, the explanation of the complexity of living organisms given 
in the 19th century by William Payley directly involved God as the principal 
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author of the ordering of the Universe (Payley [no date]). It seems quite also 
obvious that many of the ID supporters including Behe and Dembski aimed 
at creating a new intellectual framework in which the prevalent scientistic 
attitude could be overcome and the mind of a contemporary scientifically 
oriented believer reopened for the perception of the supernatural. Con-
sequently, the appraisal of the ID doctrine with the tools of the cognitive 
science of religion will not be complete unless the impact of the presented 
outcomes on the formation of the religious belief is at least briefly addressed. 
Barrett has drawn up the following cognitive distinction between natural 
religion and theology: “there is a difference between what people tend to 
believe in an automatic, day-to-day sort of way, and what they believe when 
they stop to reflect and systematically figure out what they do and do not 
believe” (Barrett 2011, 139). This means that the human mind makes use 
of two incompatible representations of the divine: the intuitive and the 
theological. Since the intuitive representation is inferentially rich and its 
activation occurs quickly and unconsciously, it secures that the thought 
processes with its use guarantee immediate inferential power thereby 
securing the execution of religiosity in the real-time mode. The theological 
representation on the other hand is abstract with its activation occurring 
slowly and consciously in a reflective mode of religious thinking. As Barrett 
frequently stresses, it demands an elaborate institutional scaffolding in the 
form of the educational institutions to provide proper instruction (Barrett 
2011, 105–106). 
As applied to the ID doctrine, Barrett’s distinction of religious beliefs 
into natural religion and theology clearly supports the invulnerability of 
the intuitive belief in the purposefulness of ordering in the Universe to its 
natural explanation by means of the evolutionary scenarios. In light of this 
it seems rational to propose that the religiously interpreted ID doctrine 
can be reasonably justified only in the mode of the natural religion as it 
serves to sustain the belief in God as the creator of the Universe. There is 
no doubt that this belief is central to any religion that attributes the origin 
and the existence of the Universe to the causal power of the pertinent deity. 
Moreover, the intuitive character of the belief in the divine design of the 
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ordering in the Universe makes this belief permanently accessible to believers 
in real-time thinking. As a result, religiosity can be continuously exercised 
without the need to resort to elaborate reasonings to substantiate its claims.
5. Concluding remarks
The analysis of the doctrine of the Intelligent Design with the tools of the 
cognitive science of religion has demonstrated that the human mind exhibits 
a marked preference towards the intuitive (non-reflective) acceptance of 
an intentional agency, that is a designer, as the author of the ordering of 
the Universe. What is most striking, however, is that this belief seems to 
reveal an unusual immunity to the development of science despite of that 
science gradually invalidates the ID’s central claims by showing that what is 
intuitively attributed to the activity of a designer turns out to be the result of 
the workings of the laws of nature. Such state of affairs gives a clear expla-
nation of the persistence of the ID doctrine even in the scientifically literate 
circles. Shortly speaking, intuitions are extremely hard to be dispensed of. 
An important cognitive factor which discredits the ID doctrine is the 
nature of the HADD itself. Since this cognitive mechanism relies on the error 
management strategy, it yields no insight into the epistemic value of this 
belief. In short, this not a truth tracking process and it is likely to generate 
false positives. It is additionally confirmed by the fact that the HADD was 
proposed on the basis of a specially constructed ancestral environment in 
which its activity had been adaptively advantageous. It remains beyond doubt 
that contemporary humans who are scientifically literate do not populate 
such environments. De Cruz and De Smedt confirm this difficulty when they 
state that “one cannot draw straightforward conclusions from evolutionary 
origins to epistemic justifications” (De Cruz and De Smedt 2012, 420). 
These considerations seem to lead to an inescapable conclusion that the 
ID doctrine is entirely unscientific for it fools its supporters to mythology. 
Such drastic claim can be somewhat alleviated as one takes into account 
the thermodynamic argument of why human mind posits a designer as it 
perceives ordered structures. Contrary to the HADD, the mechanism involved 
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relies on the second law of thermodynamics which is a well established law 
of nature whereby the corresponding mental representations may refract 
some truth on what the world really is. As is has been already indicated, an 
intelligent designer may be a part of what constitutes the folk psychology. 
Consequently, the concept of the intelligent designer can be applied to 
formulate positive theological statements concerning the nature of the su-
pernatural reality. Following the precepts of the negative theology, however, 
such predication occurs metaphorically only due the radical disproportion 
between the perfection and infinity of God and the finiteness of the human 
conceptual means that are at man’s disposal (Aquinas 1975, 141–145). 
The representation of God as the Creator in the form of the intelligent 
designer can serve only as the metaphor of God’s creative power to sustain 
the intuitive belief and cannot be used to formulate any literal theological 
statements on the nature of the divine act of creation. 
References
Aristotle. 1941. The Basic Works. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random 
House.
Aquinas, Thomas. 1975. Summa Contra Gentiles I. Translated by Anton C. Pegis. 
Notre Dame–London: University of Notre Dame Press.
Atkins, Peter and Julio De Paula. 2014. Physical Chemistry. 10th Edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Ayala, Francesco J. 2007. “Darwin’s greatest discovery: Design without designer.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 104: 8567– 8573.
Ayala, Francesco J. 2009. Dar Darwina dla nauki i religii. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Barrett, Justin L. 2000. “Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion.” Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 4(1): 29–34.
Barrett, Justin L. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God?. Lanham MD: AltaMira Press.
Barrett, Justin L. 2011. Cognitive Science, Religion and Theology: From Human Minds 
to Divine Minds. Conshohocken: Templeton Press.
Barrett, Justin L. and Melanie A. Nyhof. 2001. “Spreading the Non-natural Concepts: 
The Role of Intuitive Conceptual Structures in Memory and Transmission of 
Cultural Materials.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 1: 69–100.
8(1)/2020180
WO J C I E C H P. G RYG I E L
Behe, Michael. 1996. Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution. 
New York: The Free Press.
Bering, Jesse M. 2011. The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny and the 
Meaning of Life. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Boyer, Pascal. 2003. „Religious Thought and Behavior as By-products of Brain 
Function.” Trends in Cognitive Science 7(3): 119–124.
Boyer, Pascal. 2001. Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. 
New York: Basic Books.
Chaberek, Michał. 2014. Stworzenie czy ewolucja? Dylematy katolika. Warszawa: Fronda.
Davis, Percival and Dean H. Kenyon. 1993. Of Pandas and People: The Central Question 
of Biological Origins. Dallas: Haughton.
De Cruz, Helen and Johan De Smedt. 2015. A Natural History of Natural Theology. 
Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
De Cruz, Helen and Johan De Smedt. 2012. “Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic 
status of scientific beliefs.” Philosophical Studies 157: 411–429.
Dembski, William A. 1995. The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small 
Probabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dembski, William A. 1999. Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology. 
Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press.
Einstein, Albert. 1931. “The World as I see It.” Forum and Century” 84: 193–194.
Giertych, Maciej. 2016. Ewolucja, dewolucja, nauka. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Giertych.
Grygiel, Wojciech P. 2017. “Science and human religiosity from the perspective of the 
cognitive science of religion.” Analect Cracoviensia 49: 177–194.
Guthrie, Stewart A. 1003. Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Haught, John F. 2008. God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution. Boulder CO: 
Westview Press.
Hawking, Stephen W. and Leonard Mlodinov. 2010. The Grand Design: New Answers 
to the Ultimate Questions of Life. London – Toronto – Sydney – Auckland – Jo-
hannesburg: Batnam Press, 
Heller, Michał. 2003. “Chaos, Probability and the Compressibility of the World.” In 
Creative Tension: Essays on Science and Religion, Michał Heller, 127–143. Randor 
PA: Templeton Foundation Press. 
Heller, Michał. 2006. “Teorie wszystkiego.” In Filozofia i wszechświat, Michał Heller, 
237 – 255. Kraków: Universitas.
Heller, Michał. 2012. Filozofia przypadku. Kraków: Copernicus Center Press.
Heller, Michał and Józef Życiński. 1990. Dylematy ewolucji. Kraków: Polskie Towa-
rzystwo Teologiczne.
8(1)/2020 181
T H E D O CT R I N E O F T H E I N T E L L I G E N T D E S I G N. . .
Jodkowski, Kazimierz. 2007. “Kłopoty teistycznego ewolucjonizmu.” In Kontrowersje 
wokół początków człowieka. edited by Grzegorz Bugajak, and Jacek Tomczyk, 
209–224. Katowice: Księgarnia św. Jacka.
Keane, George J. 1999. Creation Rediscovered: Evolution and The Importance of the 
Origins Debate. Rockford, Illinois: TAN Books and Publishers.
Kelemen, Deborah. 1999. “Why Are Rocks Pointy? Children’s Preference for Tele-
ological Explanation of the Natural World.” Developmental Psychology 35(6): 
1440–1452.
Kelemen, Deborah. 2004. “Are children “intuitive theists”? Reasoning about purpose 
and design in nature.” Psychological Science 15(5): 295–301.
Korzeniewski, Bernard. 2005. Od neuronu do (samo)świadomości. Prószyński i S-ka.
Leslie, Alan M. 1999. “A Theory of Agency.” In Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary 
Debate, edited by Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann J. Premack, 121–149. 
Oxford: Clarendon.
Payley, William. [no date]. Natural Theology. New York: American Tract Society.
Penrose, Roger. 1991. The Emperor’s New Mind. New York: Penguine Books.
Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers. 1990. Z chaosu ku porządkowi. Warszawa: 
Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy.
Sørensen, Jesper. 2005. “Charisma, Tradition and Ritual.” In Mind and Religion: Psy-
chological and Cognitive Foundations of Religiosity, edited by Harvey Whitehouse, 
and Robert N. McCauley, 167–186. Walnut Creek CA: AltaMira Press.
Swinburne, Richard. 1992. “The Argument from Design.” In Readings in the Philosophy 
of Religion: An Analytic Approach, edited by Baruch A. Brody, 189–201. Englewood 
Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.
